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ARTICLE  III  IN  THE  POLITICAL  BRANCHES
Tara Leigh Grove*
ABSTRACT
In many separation of powers debates, scholars excavate the practices and constitutional
interpretations of Congress and the executive branch in order to discern the scope of various
constitutional provisions.  I argue that similar attention to political branch practice is warranted
in the Article III context.  That is true, in large part because much of the constitutional history of
the federal courts has been written not by the federal judiciary, but by the legislative and executive
branches.  To illustrate this point, this Essay focuses on the Exceptions Clause of Article III.  The
Supreme Court has said little about the meaning of this provision, leaving the legislative and
executive branches largely on their own in defining the scope of the “exceptions power.”  The
debates over this provision shed light not only on how the political branches have construed
Article III but also on how the political branches approach constitutional interpretation more
generally.  This Essay concludes by raising questions about whether, or the extent to which, the
practices and constitutional interpretations of the political branches should inform the way in
which the judiciary interprets Article III.
INTRODUCTION
Many separation of powers questions—such as the scope of the war or
treaty powers—rarely, if ever, reach the judiciary.  Accordingly, those ques-
tions must of necessity be answered by the political branches.  For this rea-
son, scholars often excavate the practices and constitutional interpretations
of Congress and the executive branch in order to discern the meaning of
constitutional provisions.  Indeed, “[a]rguments based on [such] historical
practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of
powers.”1
© 2015 Tara Leigh Grove.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School.  I am grateful to Neal Devins, John
Manning, Jim Pfander, and Mark Seidenfeld for helpful discussions of this project or
comments on earlier drafts.  This Essay was prepared for the Federal Courts Section panel
on “The Role of History in the Federal Courts Canon” at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools.
1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 412–13, 461–85 (2012) (asserting that “[a]rguments based on his-
torical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers
. . . . [as] [t]hese arguments are especially common in debates over the distribution of
authority between Congress and the executive branch,” and discussing in detail debates
1835
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There is, however, far less focus on political branch practice in Article III
scholarship.  In this Essay, building on prior work,2 I seek to raise questions
about this Article III exceptionalism.  I suggest that there are good reasons
for scholars to consider the work of the legislature and the executive branch
in analyzing Article III issues.  As in other separation of powers arenas, many
important questions arising under Article III have rarely, if ever, reached the
judiciary and have instead been addressed by the political branches.3  For
example, the Supreme Court has said very little about Congress’s power to
make “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.4
Thus, the political branches have largely been on their own in defining the
scope of the “exceptions power.”
Scholarly study of legislative and executive interpretations of Article III is
important for two major reasons.  First, such practices are likely to inform
future executive and legislative debates.  As described below, political actors
often look at their own precedents in evaluating the constitutionality and
propriety of jurisdictional proposals.  Second, such scholarly study can pro-
vide insight into the way that the political branches approach constitutional
interpretation.
I do not, however, assert that federal courts should necessarily treat
political branch practice as authoritative evidence of the meaning of Article
III, if and when similar issues reach the courts.  In fact, I suggest that there
are reasons for the judiciary to be cautious about relying heavily on the work
product of political actors.  The political branches may approach the process
of constitutional interpretation in a way that differs considerably from what a
judge deems appropriate.  Moreover, it may be difficult for judges to discern
over the war power, congressional-executive agreements, and the removal of executive
officers).
2 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 250 (2012) [hereinafter Grove, Article II Safeguards]; Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions
Clause as a Structural Safeguard, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (2013) [hereinafter Grove, Excep-
tions Clause]; Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards].
3 That is true, for example, of the meaning of “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
Scholars have debated whether the term “one supreme Court” requires the Court to sit en
banc or permits the Court to decide cases in panels. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary
Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 274 (1992)
(noting that “one supreme Court” may suggest that “it would be unconstitutional for that
Court to sit in panels”); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States
Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1442 (2009) (advocating a
panel system to enable the Court to hear more cases).  The historical practice of the politi-
cal branches may shed light on this debate. See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at
979 n.272 (offering a brief overview of the congressional debates and noting that some
legislators doubt that such a reform would be consistent with the constitutional require-
ment of “one supreme Court”).
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  The Court’s main precedent on the exceptions power, Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), is discussed below. See Part II.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL503.txt unknown Seq: 3 10-JUL-15 13:22
2015] article  i i i  in  the  political  branches 1837
whether a measure was enacted or rejected for constitutional, as opposed to
policy, reasons.  In sum, I suggest that the political branches and the judiciary
may engage in distinct enterprises when they interpret the scope of Article III
(and perhaps other constitutional provisions as well).
The Essay proceeds as follows.  Part I focuses on the Exceptions Clause,
providing a survey of executive and legislative practice with respect to that
clause.  Part II then examines what this survey might tell us about constitu-
tional interpretation in the executive and legislative branches, and raises sev-
eral questions about judicial reliance on such political branch practice.
I. CASE STUDY: THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
In prior work, I documented many of the legislative and executive
debates over congressional regulations of Supreme Court jurisdiction and
offered political, structural, and institutional explanations for why jurisdic-
tion-stripping measures have generally failed, and why more beneficial regu-
lations have been enacted.5  But my earlier work did not focus on the degree
to which the debates occurred on constitutional terms.  Here, I highlight the
constitutional side of those political debates—to see how the political
branches have given meaning to the Exceptions Clause.
A. Background:Text and the McCardle Case
Article III declares that the “judicial Power shall extend to all Cases”
arising under federal law and that the Supreme Court “shall have appellate
Jurisdiction” over such federal question cases.6  The Constitution thereby
seems to give the Supreme Court an important role in defining the content
of federal law.  But Article III goes on to provide that the Court’s appellate
review power is subject to “such Exceptions, and . . . such Regulations as the
Congress shall make.”7
The Supreme Court has said very little about the scope of Congress’s
power under the Exceptions Clause.  The Court’s primary opportunity to
construe the Clause occurred during the post–Civil War era, when William
McCardle brought a habeas corpus action challenging the constitutionality of
5 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 252–55 (asserting that the executive
branch has institutional incentives that lead it to oppose many jurisdiction-stripping
efforts); Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at 931–33 (suggesting that the political
branches have enacted beneficial exceptions like certiorari measures to facilitate Supreme
Court settlement of important federal questions); Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2,
at 871–73 (arguing that, throughout much of our history, some political faction has gener-
ally supported the judiciary and used its veto power in the House or the Senate to block
jurisdiction-stripping measures).
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . . . .”).
7 Id. (“[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction . . . with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).
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the federal laws governing Reconstruction.8  While the case was pending in
the Supreme Court, Congress enacted—over a presidential veto—a law
restricting the Court’s jurisdiction over direct appeals in habeas cases.9  Con-
gress’s goal was apparently to prevent the Court from striking down the
reconstruction laws in Ex parte McCardle.10
In McCardle, the Supreme Court applied this newly established limit on
its appellate jurisdiction and dismissed McCardle’s appeal.11  In its decision,
the Court emphasized the breadth of Congress’s exceptions power: “We are
not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.  We can only
examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words.”12  The Court went on to underscore, however, that the 1868 legisla-
tion had not cut off all avenues of Supreme Court review.13  As the Court
later explained in Ex parte Yerger, it could still review lower court decisions
denying habeas relief because Congress had left in place its jurisdiction to
hear original habeas petitions under the Judiciary Act of 1789.14
Scholars have long debated the implications of McCardle.  Although
many scholars view the case as demonstrating that Congress has plenary
power over Supreme Court jurisdiction,15 others insist that McCardle permits
Congress to restrict jurisdiction only when it provides an alternative avenue
of Court review.16  The important point, for my purposes, is that political
actors have recognized that McCardle is subject to varying interpretations and
have not treated the case as the final word on the Exceptions Clause.  Accord-
ingly, legislative and executive officials have offered their own constructions
of that provision of Article III.
8 See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV.
229, 236–38 (1973).
9 See Repeal Act of 1868, ch. 34, § 4, 15 Stat. 44, 44; Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra
note 2, at 924.
10 Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2, at 923–24.
11 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869).
12 Id. at 514.
13 See id. (“The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals
from Circuit Courts under the act of 1867.  It does not affect the jurisdiction which was
previously exercised.”).
14 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105–06 (1869).
15 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 905 (1984) (“[T]he bulk of
the McCardle opinion speaks very broadly and does not seem to turn on the availability of
an alternative route of appellate review.”).
16 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Super-
vise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1501 (2000) (noting that the Court in McCardle
“emphasi[zed] . . . the availability of . . . an alternative source of inferior court review”).
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B. The Exceptions Power in Congress Post-McCardle
In the century and a half since McCardle,17 Congress has virtually never
used its exceptions power to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Instead, Congress has often used its power to facilitate the Court’s capacity to
oversee the lower courts—by creating and expanding discretionary certiorari
review.  The debates over these measures may shed light on legislators’ views
of the exceptions power.
1. The Rejection of Jurisdiction-Stripping Measures
Virtually every jurisdiction-stripping proposal in Congress has failed,
often without emerging from committee.18  I discuss here three jurisdiction-
stripping efforts, which were in fact debated in Congress.  These three exam-
ples suggest that legislators were concerned about not only the propriety but
also the constitutionality of the proposed legislation.
Admittedly, the line between “constitutional” and “policy” arguments is
not always clear.  Take, for example, the (frequent) comments of legislators
that restrictions on Supreme Court jurisdiction would undermine the uni-
form enforcement of federal law.19  Although some scholars have asserted
that preserving the uniformity of federal law is among the Supreme Court’s
essential constitutional functions,20 others argue that uniformity—while per-
17 There does not appear to have been much discussion in Congress about the mean-
ing of the exceptions power between the Founding and Reconstruction.  Interestingly,
what many scholars consider the most dramatic attack on the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction in the antebellum era did not focus on the Exceptions Clause.  In 1831, a
majority of the House Judiciary Committee recommended that Congress repeal section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized Supreme Court review of state court deci-
sions on federal questions.  But supporters of the repeal did not rely on the Exceptions
Clause; instead, they argued that Congress lacked the affirmative power to enact section 25
because (in their view) the Constitution permitted the Supreme Court to review decisions
only from the inferior federal courts, not from state courts.  7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxix-lxxx
(1831) (Report upon the Judiciary) (“[T]he constitution does not confer power on the
federal judiciary over the judicial departments of the States”).  Ultimately, this jurisdiction-
stripping effort was overwhelmingly defeated. See 7 REG. DEB. 542 (1831) (showing that
the House rejected the bill by a vote of 138–51).
18 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 277–78 (6th ed. 2009); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 43 (Supp. 2014).
19 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Melvin
Watt) (underscoring “the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in establishing uniform stan-
dards”); 125 CONG. REC. 7632 (1979) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (criticizing a
proposal to strip federal jurisdiction in school prayer cases on the ground that, absent
Supreme Court review, “[w]e are going to run into a situation in which 50 States could
have 50 different interpretations of what the law of the land is”); see also Grove, Structural
Safeguards, supra note 2, at 921–22 (noting the political branches’ emphasis on the need
for uniform enforcement of federal law).
20 See, e.g., Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161–65 (1960) (arguing that the Court’s “essential
appellate functions” are to preserve the uniformity and supremacy of federal law).  Leo-
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haps desirable—does not rise to the level of a constitutional concern.21  I do
not attempt here to classify any particular argument as inherently a “constitu-
tional” or “policy” one.  Instead, I generally rely on the legislators’ own char-
acterizations of their arguments; if they claim to be making a constitutional
argument, then I treat it as a constitutional argument.
One additional clarification.  One of the trends that I have noticed in
many jurisdiction-stripping debates—both those discussed here and others
that I have reviewed in my prior work—is the emphasis on political branch
precedent.  Legislators were concerned both about the meaning of their own
prior practices and (at least for those who opposed jurisdiction-stripping
measures) with establishing a “bad” precedent for the future.  I include these
arguments here as well because legislators seemed to view their precedents as
relevant to the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping measures.
Subversive Activity.  In the late 1950s, Senators William Jenner and John
Butler proposed a bill that would eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over certain claims by suspected communists.22  Senator Jenner
argued that the “so-called Warren Court” had done much to “confuse, disarm
and paralyze the people in their fight . . . against the world Communist con-
spiracy” and thus it was “time to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.”23
Both legislators insisted that the jurisdiction-stripping measure was well
within Congress’s constitutional authority.  Senator Jenner argued that the
words of the Exceptions Clause “are hard, firm, and clear as crystal” and give
to Congress the “full, unchallengeable power to pass laws immediately which
nard Ratner built upon Henry Hart’s “essential role” theory, which is discussed below. See
infra note 150.
21 See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (2008) (noting
that “many . . . disagree with the claim that uniformity is constitutionally prescribed” and
citing legal scholars who argue that any claim that uniformity is constitutionally required
lacks textual support).
22 The initial bill proposed by Senator William Jenner would have cut off jurisdiction
in five areas. See Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing
on S. 2646 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal
Sec. Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1–2 (1957) [hereinafter Limitation of
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court] (statement of Sen. William E. Jenner)
(showing that the bill sought to strip the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over (1) the func-
tions of congressional committees; (2) decisions by executive agencies to terminate disloyal
employees; (3) any state law on subversive activity; (4) any school board rule governing
subversive activity among teachers; and (5) any state law pertaining to bar admissions).
The new Jenner-Butler bill that emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee sought to
strip jurisdiction only over state bar admissions. See 104 CONG. REC. 18647–49 (1958)
(statement of Sen. John Butler).  The proposal was designed to counter Supreme Court
decisions that had invalidated state court denials of bar admission to suspected commu-
nists. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273–74 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Exam’rs,
353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957).
23 Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 22, at 6,
23 (statement of Sen. William Jenner).
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would deprive the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction.”24  Senator But-
ler asserted that the Exceptions Clause was an important part of the constitu-
tional system of “checks and balances.”25  In fact, it was the “only check which
the Constitution gives to the Congress as a protection against attempted usur-
pation [of federal and state legislative authority] by the Supreme Court.”26
Other legislators, however, strongly opposed the measure, in part on
constitutional grounds.  Senator Alexander Wiley acknowledged that under
the Exceptions Clause, Congress had “the legal right . . . within certain limits
to constrict the appellate authority of the Supreme Court.”27  But he insisted
that although “[t]he right fundamentally exists,” “it can hardly be described
as a total right.”28  Senator Wiley asserted that the exceptions power was lim-
ited by a “principle of reasonableness.”29  Applying this principle, he argued
that it was unreasonable—and therefore unconstitutional—to eliminate the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction solely because members of Congress
disagreed with certain decisions.30  Senator Thomas Hennings both doubted
the constitutionality of the measure and worried that it would establish a dan-
gerous precedent.31  “[O]nce we begin to whittle at the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, the floodgates will be open.  Then heaven help the United
States and our present system of checks and balances . . . .”32  “This could be
the first swing of the ax in chipping away the whole foundation of our inde-
pendent Federal judiciary.”33
Moreover, rather than seeing McCardle as support for the Jenner-Butler
bill, opponents used McCardle to condemn it.34  Senator Hennings, for exam-
ple, argued that the Jenner-Butler bill was “reminiscent of” that “ill-advised
24 Id. at 13.
25 104 CONG. REC. 18651 (1958) (statement of Sen. John Butler) (asserting that the
Exceptions Clause did not get “into the Constitution by chance” and that it “is one of the
specific check-and-balance provisions of the Constitution”).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 18682 (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 18682–83.
30 Id. at 18683 (“[T]he implementation of the disagreements with the Supreme Court
decision by the enactment of law to make such decisions in the future impossible” is an
“abuse  . . . of the powers of the legislature to determine the appellate powers of the High
Court”); see also id. (“This legislation violently tampers with the basic law of the land as
established by the Founding Fathers.”).
31 See id. at 18685 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings) (“The [Jenner-Butler bill] . . .
contains provisions which would affect the rights and liberties of all our people.  In my
humble opinion, a constitutional issue is raised by every provision of the amendment.”).
32 Id. at 18685–86.
33 Id. at 18686.
34 See, e.g., id. at 18682 (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley) (“Had the thinking con-
tained in [this bill] prevailed from the days of the constitutional convention how possi-
bly—I ask—would our Government have been able to survive in its essential and original
form? The destruction that would have been meted out to it in the notorious McCardle
case . . . would then have been fatal.”).
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attack[ ] on the Supreme Court.”35  “I do not believe this Senate desires to
join the ranks of the Reconstruction Senate of 1868 and 1869 . . . .”36  Ulti-
mately, the Senate rejected the Jenner-Butler bill in its entirety.37
School Prayer.  In the 1970s and 1980s, Senator Jesse Helms repeatedly
proposed legislation to strip federal jurisdiction over cases involving volun-
tary school prayer.38  Senator Helms and his supporters argued that Congress
had ample authority to enact such a measure: “In anticipation of judicial
usurpations of power, the framers of our Constitution wisely gave the Con-
gress the authority, by a simple majority of both Houses, to check the
Supreme Court” by making “exceptions” to its appellate jurisdiction.39
Many members of Congress responded to Helms’ proposal by arguing
that it was not only unwise but also unconstitutional.  For example, oppo-
nents insisted that the Exceptions Clause did not permit Congress to inter-
fere with “the core functions of the Supreme Court” by taking away its power
to review state court decisions in constitutional cases.40  Instead, Congress
could use its exceptions power only to “‘obviate and remove’ . . . ‘inconve-
niences’ likely to arise within the judicial system.”41  Congress could not
“encroach[ ] on the judicial function” and thereby “violate the doctrine of
separation of powers.”42
The legislators also debated the implications of their own precedents.
Senator Helms, for his part, denied that his measure was an “‘unprece-
dented’ proposal,” pointing out that previous Congresses had considered
35 Id. at 18686 (statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings).
36 Id.
37 See id. at 18687 (recording that the Senate defeated the measure forty-nine to forty-
one).
38 See LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 130 (2002) (noting that Senator
Helms “took the lead in promoting this type of court-stripping bill” and began introducing
such measures in 1974).
39 125 CONG. REC. 7579 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (“Section 2 of article
III states in clear and unequivocal language that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is
subject to ‘such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.’”)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see also 128 CONG. REC. 21854 (1982) (statement of Sen.
Jeremiah Denton) (“The exception provision, like the commerce clause, is a plenary power
to be exercised at the discretion of the Congress”).
40 128 CONG. REC. 21862 (1982) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan); id. at
21844 (statement of Sen. Gary Hart) (Congress may not impair the Supreme Court’s “core
functions”); see also 128 CONG. REC. 21857 (1982) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (noting
that “the Framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court enforce the
supremacy clause” by reviewing state court decisions on all constitutional questions).  The
focus on the Court’s “core functions” built upon arguments made by the executive.  I dis-
cuss the executive’s position in Part II.B.
41 128 CONG. REC. 21858 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 80, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
42 Id. at 21857 (disagreeing that “the exceptions clause gives Congress power to with-
draw specific categories of cases from the Court’s review”).
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jurisdiction-stripping bills.43  Senator Edward Kennedy responded, however,
that those precedents actually undermined Helms’ arguments because those
prior bills had been uniformly rejected by Congress.44  But, Senator Kennedy
and other opponents warned, passage of the school prayer measure would
establish “a very dangerous precedent” that would make it easier for future
Congresses to strip federal jurisdiction over other constitutional issues.45
“This type of restriction on the judicial power, once applied in this instance,
will become ever easier to apply in the future. . . . The result will be to
weaken, if not cripple, the independence of the Federal judiciary and subvert
the U.S. Constitution.”46
For most of its history, the school prayer bill died in the Senate, often
without getting past the Senate Judiciary Committee.47  On the one occasion
when the measure passed the Senate, it was rejected by the House Judiciary
Committee.48  During the House committee hearings, several representatives
expressed constitutional concerns about the measure.49  Representative
George Danielson, for example, worried that a broad construction of the
exceptions power would enable Congress to “repeal the entire Bill of Rights”
or indeed “any of the restrictions which are in the Constitution—simply by
the device of limiting or abolishing appellate jurisdiction.”50
43 125 CONG. REC. 7636 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (“I suspect that some
potential difficulty with this amendment may result from a lack of knowledge regarding its
legislative precedence.  Some have described it as an ‘unprecedented’ proposal . . . . Noth-
ing could be more incorrect.”).
44 Id. (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (“The fact is that none of those is law . . . .
[T]he Senator from North Carolina would be unable to give us any action by Congress
which would take away the [Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction to deal with constitutional
issues.”).
45 Id. at 7654 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh) (“We are setting a very dangerous prece-
dent that could go far beyond prayer.”); see id. at 7632 (statement of Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy) (“The [bill] establishes a precedent for all types of mischief.”).
46 Id. at 7644 (statement of Sen. John Durkin).
47 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2, at 905.
48 See id. at 905-07; see also Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguards for Religious Liberty, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 31, 71 (2001) (noting that from 1978–1988, Congress “rejected efforts to strip
the federal courts of jurisdiction in school prayer cases”).
49 Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings—Federal Court Jurisdiction: Hearing on S. 450
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. 25 (1980) (statement of Rep. George Danielson) (arguing that the
school prayer measure “assuming it became law—would be an unconstitutional law”); see
also id. 2–3, 459 (statement of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier) (stating that “it would seem
unreasonable to assume that Congress has indiscriminate authority” under the Exceptions
Clause).
50 Id. at 458 (statement of Rep. George Danielson); see also id. at 459 (arguing that it
was “imperative that we start to clarify the meaning of [the Exceptions Clause] and . . .
refute [the] argument” for unlimited power “before it takes on life of its own”).  Represen-
tative Danielson believed, as some scholars have argued, that Congress had the power only
to move cases between the Supreme Court’s original and appellate jurisdiction. Id. at
458–59.
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The Pledge of Allegiance.  More recently, in the first decade of the twenty-
first century, legislators debated a proposal to strip federal jurisdiction over
cases involving the Pledge of Allegiance.51  The legislation was a reaction to a
Ninth Circuit decision holding that the use of “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause.52
Supporters of the Pledge bill answered claims that the measure was
“anticonstitutional” by pointing to the Exceptions Clause53 and to the
Court’s decision in McCardle.54  These legislators insisted that “[i]t is black
letter law in the Constitution . . . that this body, this Congress, shall have the
authority to set the jurisdiction of the courts.”55  “The simple fact is, the fram-
ers of the Constitution did not want an unelected, unaccountable, life-ten-
ured body, namely, the judiciary, to be able to . . . enact policy across the
country,” without any mechanism for “the people themselves . . . to reverse”
those decisions.56
Opponents, however, argued against the measure on both policy and
constitutional grounds.57  They asserted that “while Congress has the power
to regulate” federal jurisdiction, “the courtstripping language of [the Pledge
bill] grossly exceeds that power in violation of the principles of separation of
51 The initial measure would have stripped only lower federal court jurisdiction.  The
bill was later revised to encompass Supreme Court jurisdiction as well. See H.R. REP. NO.
108-691, at 2 (2004).
52 See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 610, 605–12 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by
328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1, 15–18 (2004) (concluding that the “sole purpose [of the 1954 statute adding “under
God” to the Pledge] was to advance religion”).  The Supreme Court later reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision on standing grounds and did not reach the merits of the constitu-
tional claim. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 15–18 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring the challenge on behalf of his public school daughter because he did not have
custody).
53 152 CONG. REC. H5409 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Mike Pence)
(quoting the Exceptions Clause and stating “let us stop with all the conversation about
anticonstitutional action being taken”); see 150 CONG. REC. H7473 (daily ed. Sept 23, 2004)
(statement of Rep. John Hostettler) (arguing that “article III section 2 of the Constitution”
provides “the basis for the legislation”).
54 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 11 (2004) (asserting that “[a] remedy to abuses by
Federal judges has long been understood to lie, among other places, in Congress’s author-
ity to limit Federal court jurisdiction,” and citing McCardle in support, stating that “the
Supreme Court has upheld a statute removing jurisdiction from it in a pending case”); 152
CONG. REC. H5409 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Steve King) (“[T]he
landmark case is Ex parte McCardle [in] 1869 where Congress . . . purported to be acting
under its authority under [the Exceptions Clause].”).
55 152 CONG. REC. H5409 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Mike Pence).
56 150 CONG. REC. H7473 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep. John Hostet-
tler) (“[T]he notion of an independent judiciary fails the Constitution test.”).
57 See, e.g., id. at H7469 (statement of Rep. Barbara Lee) (“It is unacceptable and
unconstitutional to propose stripping powers from the judicial branch every time we disa-
gree with a decision they make.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL503.txt unknown Seq: 11 10-JUL-15 13:22
2015] article  i i i  in  the  political  branches 1845
powers.”58  “For over 200 years, since Marbury v. Madison in 1803, the
Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of what is constitutional and what is
not.”59  Opponents also denied that McCardle supported the Pledge bill,
pointing out that the Court in that case “surrendered only a single procedu-
ral avenue for appellate review.”60
Interestingly, even some legislators who favored stripping lower federal
court jurisdiction over the Pledge cases strongly opposed the effort to restrict
Supreme Court review.61  Representative Judith Biggert, for example, had
cosponsored an earlier bill that applied only to the lower federal courts but
“[could] not support” the attempt to cut off Supreme Court review.62  She
“caution[ed her] colleagues to think twice before tampering with authorities
clearly granted in the Constitution.”63
Members of Congress were also very concerned about their own prece-
dents on the scope of the exceptions power.  While some opponents of the
Pledge bill cautioned that passage of the measure would establish a danger-
ous precedent that “would no doubt lead to further assaults on the judici-
ary,”64 others emphasized the lack of past precedents for jurisdiction-
stripping laws.  “The fact that no other Congress has passed a law that totally
eliminates the federal courts’ ability to review the constitutionality of a fed-
eral law should give all of the Members pause when considering this legisla-
tion.”65  Notably, notwithstanding the constitutional objections raised by
House members, the Pledge bill did pass the House on two occasions.  But
the measure was ultimately defeated in the Senate Judiciary Committee.66
58 152 CONG. REC. H5400 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Robert Scott); see
H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 94 (2004) (“By denying the Supreme Court its historical role as
the final authority on the constitutionality of federal laws, [the bill] unnecessarily and
unconstitutionally usurps the Court’s power.”).
59 152 CONG. REC. H5400 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Robert Scott).
60 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 107–08 (2004) (Minority Report).
61 For example, Representative Melvin Watt sought to return the bill to its original
form by amending it to apply only to the inferior federal courts. See Grove, Structural
Safeguards, supra note 2, at 913 n.252 (describing Representative Watt’s unsuccessful efforts
to amend the bill).
62 150 CONG. REC. H7472 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep. Judy Biggert).
63 Id. (arguing that “Congress clearly has the authority under article III . . . to define
the jurisdiction of the Federal district and appellate courts . . . . But this new bill strips the
Supreme Court jurisdiction, and I cannot support that”); see also id. (“[T]he Supreme
Court should be the final arbiter of all Federal questions.”).
64 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 91–92 (2004) (Minority Report) (stating that
“[e]nactment of [the Pledge bill] would constitute a very undesirable precedent and would
no doubt lead to further assaults on the judiciary”); see 152 CONG. REC. H5412 (daily ed.
July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. John Dingell, Jr.) (“This [Pledge bill] is a precedent
which is going to live to curse us . . . .”).
65 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 105 (2004) (Minority Report); see also id. at 95 (“The
failure of Congress to enact legislation totally eliminating federal jurisdiction to review the
constitutionality of federal statutes is evidence of the long deference and respect main-
tained by Congress for the principle of federal judicial review.”).
66 Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2, at 915–16.
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2. Beneficial “Exceptions”: Certiorari Review
Although scholars have long debated the scope of Congress’s (rarely
used) power to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, they have largely over-
looked an important way in which Congress has used its exceptions power—
one that the Justices viewed as beneficial.67  As I have detailed in prior
work,68 on many occasions from 1891 to 1988, Congress made “exceptions”
to the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction and granted it discretionary
review via writs of certiorari.  Congress made these exceptions in response to
the Court’s own assertions that it was so burdened by the cases it was required
to review that it was unable to resolve in a timely manner many important
federal question cases from the lower federal and state courts.  Congress thus
granted certiorari review to enable the Court to focus its limited resources on
resolving important issues of federal law and settling conflicts among the
lower courts.69
The debates over these certiorari measures make clear that the political
branches understood these measures as exercises of the “exceptions power.”
Indeed, that was the power that Chief Justice Morrison Waite urged Congress
to use to help the Court address its caseload crisis in the late nineteenth
century.70  Emphasizing that the Supreme Court’s “appellate jurisdiction is
subject entirely to congressional control,” the Chief Justice requested legisla-
tion that would “help to make the . . . Court what its name implies, a power-
ful auxiliary in the administration of justice,” rather than “an obstacle
standing in the way” of the final resolution of cases.71  In the legislative
debates leading up to the Judiciary Act of 1891, the first statute to grant certi-
orari review, prominent members of Congress likewise argued that Congress
had the power to make such “exceptions” to the Court’s mandatory appellate
jurisdiction.  For example, House Judiciary Committee Chairman David Cul-
berson declared that “the authority vested in Congress to make exceptions to
and regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was granted for
the purpose of enabling the Congress to adapt the appellate jurisdiction of
the court to the varying demands of the business, trade, and commerce of
67 See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at 964, 970, 971 & n. 225, 979–80 (describ-
ing the Justices’ support for certiorari legislation).
68 For a detailed discussion of the legislative debates, see id. at 948–78.
69 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-660, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 779
(asserting that the expansion of certiorari review would enable the Court to perform its
two “principal functions” of “resolv[ing] cases involving principles . . . of wide public
importance” and “ensur[ing] uniformity and consistency in the law by resolving conflicts”
among the lower courts); S. REP. NO. 68-362, at 3 (1924) (noting that “cases should not go
to the Supreme Court . . . unless the questions involved are of grave public concern” or
there is a conflict among the lower courts); Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at
976–77 (noting the broad support for the measure).
70 Remarks of Chief Justice Waite, 36 ALB. L.J. 318, 318 (1887).
71 Id.
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the country” and “to protect and shield that great tribunal . . . from an exces-
sive burden of litigation.”72
Over the next century, Congress continued to assume that it had power
under the Exceptions Clause to “restrict or reduce the [mandatory] appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . in order to enable it fairly to meet the
demands that are made upon it.”73  Thus, in the debates leading up to the
Judiciary Act of 1988, the law that granted the Supreme Court discretionary
review over virtually every case,74 the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
In establishing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Article III, Congress
can confer as much or as little compulsory jurisdiction as it deems necessary
and proper, including such exceptions as Congress thinks appropriate.  If Congress
wants to make the Court’s appellate jurisdiction totally discretionary or
totally obligatory in nature, nothing in the Constitution says “no.”  See Ex
parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).75
The Senate committee’s reliance on McCardle is striking.  Many com-
mentators worry that McCardle gives Congress a license to eliminate impor-
tant federal cases from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  Yet, in the late
twentieth century, the Senate Judiciary Committee turned that fear on its
head by invoking McCardle to justify an “exception” that was designed to give
the Court the means to decide important federal questions.
Admittedly, the fact that Congress has relied on the Exceptions Clause
to enact measures that the Supreme Court viewed as beneficial does not pre-
clude Congress from using its exceptions power in other ways.  Nevertheless,
these certiorari measures do demonstrate how the Exceptions Clause can
serve an important function in the constitutional design, even if Congress
never uses it to strip Supreme Court jurisdiction.  Congress has repeatedly
made “exceptions” that facilitate the Court’s capacity to resolve important
questions of federal law.
C. The Exceptions Power in the Executive Branch
Like most legislators, the executive branch from the late nineteenth cen-
tury to modern times consistently supported the expansion of certiorari juris-
diction to facilitate Supreme Court review of important federal questions.76
Beginning in the early twentieth century,77 the executive branch also consid-
72 21 CONG. REC. 3403–04 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson) (arguing that
“[t]he remedy” for the Court’s caseload crisis was “within the easy reach of Congress”
under the Exceptions Clause).
73 66 CONG. REC. 2752 (1925) (statement of Sen. Albert Baird Cummins).
74 See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988).
75 S. REP. NO. 96-35, at 2–3 (1979) (emphasis added); see S. REP. NO. 100-300, at 3
(1988) (same); see also S. REP. NO. 95-985, at 3 (1978) (same).
76 See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at 980.
77 The discussion here focuses on executive branch practice beginning in the early
twentieth century.  There were few challenges to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion in the nineteenth century.  As to those challenges, the executive branch’s record is
mixed.  For a discussion, see Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 268–69 n. 80–81,
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ered the scope of Congress’s authority to remove classes of cases from the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  The executive branch consistently opposed
such jurisdiction-stripping measures—apparently in part because of doubts
about the constitutionality of such measures.78  That was true even when the
executive branch strongly disagreed with the Supreme Court’s constitutional
decisions—as during the Franklin Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations.
Ultimately, in the late twentieth century, the executive branch publicly
announced that Congress lacks the power to make “exceptions” that under-
mine the Supreme Court’s “core functions,” such as its power to hear consti-
tutional claims.  I offer here an overview of the executive branch’s analysis of
the scope of Congress’s exceptions power.
In the 1930s, after the Supreme Court struck down key New Deal pro-
grams,79 President Franklin Roosevelt considered a range of responses to the
Court’s decisions.80  Although far better known for the Court-packing plan
(which is discussed further below),81 the Roosevelt Administration also con-
sidered proposals to restrict the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.82  In a series
of internal memoranda, Assistant Solicitor General Warner Gardner (who,
notably, would later draft the Court-packing plan)83 argued that Congress
lacked the power to strip Supreme Court jurisdiction over constitutional
claims.84  He reasoned: “It is abundantly clear that the members of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 viewed as one of the basic functions of the judiciary
the power to declare legislation unconstitutional.”85  Accordingly, the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over constitutional issues was “immun[e] from
307 n.334; see also id. at 307 n.334 (observing that the executive’s opposition to jurisdiction-
stripping measures may be “a modern development”).
78 See id. at 268–86.  Internal memos suggest that in the early-to-mid twentieth century,
executive officials disagreed on the scope of Congress’s exceptions power. See id. at
271–72.  That may explain why the executive did not initially take a firm public position on
the constitutionality of such measures.
79 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–12 (1936) (invalidating the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act).
80 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 269–71.
81 See infra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
82 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 270–72.  One administrative official
argued that Congress did have broad power to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion but strongly advised against that approach. See id. at 271–72.  I focus on Assistant
Solicitor General Warner Gardner’s views, because my prior research indicates that he had
a good deal more influence within the administration—as reflected by the fact that he was
asked to draft the President’s Court-packing plan. See infra note 83 and accompanying
text.
83 See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT
253–54, 256 (2010).
84 Memorandum from Warner W. Gardner, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
to the Solicitor General 2–5, 10, 13 (Aug. 15, 1935) (copy on file with author) (stating that
the Supreme Court’s “immunity from legislative control includes the power to declare leg-
islation unconstitutional”).
85 Id. at 10–11.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-5\NDL503.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-JUL-15 13:22
2015] article  i i i  in  the  political  branches 1849
legislative control.”86  Gardner thus recommended that the President instead
go forward with a plan to “pack” the Supreme Court because that method of
addressing the Court’s decisions was “certainly constitutional and . . . may be
done quickly and with a fair assurance of success.”87
In the 1950s, the executive branch also opposed the effort of Senators
Jenner and Butler to eliminate Supreme Court jurisdiction over certain
claims involving suspected communists.88  Although the executive branch
stated that the Jenner-Butler bill raised constitutional concerns,89 it did not
take a firm public position on the scope of Congress’s exceptions power.
Instead, President Dwight Eisenhower’s Attorney General William Rogers
objected to the measure in language that could be construed as either consti-
tutional or policy arguments, asserting that “[f]ull and unimpaired appellate
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is fundamental under our system of gov-
ernment.”90  The Attorney General urged Congress not to repeat the “mis-
take” that it had made “during the troublous days of reconstruction,” when it
stripped Supreme Court jurisdiction in habeas cases.91
Finally, in the late twentieth century, the Carter and Reagan Administra-
tions firmly declared that any effort to strip the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over constitutional claims was not only unwise but also unconsti-
tutional.  Both administrations reasoned that Congress may not “make
‘exceptions’ to Supreme Court jurisdiction which would intrude upon [its]
core functions . . . as an independent and equal branch in our system of
86 Id. at 10–11, 13.
87 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 115 (1995) (quoting Memorandum from Warner
W. Gardner, supra note 84).
88 Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 22, at
574 (letter from Att’y Gen. William P. Rogers to Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).  Notably, Attorney General William Rogers commented on what
was at that time the Jenner bill. See supra note 22.  The executive continued to oppose the
jurisdiction-stripping bill after it became the Jenner-Butler bill. See S. REP. NO. 85-1586, at
36–37 (1958) (Minority Appendix B) (letter from Deputy Att’y Gen. Lawrence E. Walsh to
Sen. Alexander Wiley) (“Aside from possible questions of constitutionality which may be
raised by a provision withdrawing jurisdiction over a narrowly limited class of cases, this
Department doubts the wisdom of dealing, at this time, with specific Supreme Court rul-
ings by amendments to the Court’s jurisdictional statute.”).
89 S. REP. NO. 85-1586, at 36–37 (1958) (Minority Appendix B) (letter from Deputy
Att’y Gen. Lawrence E. Walsh to Sen. Alexander Wiley) (noting that the measure raised
“possible questions of constitutionality”).
90 Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 22, at
573 (letter from Att’y Gen. William P. Rogers to Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary); see also id. at 573-74 (“I am convinced that in the absence of some
final arbiter the maintenance of the balance contemplated in our Constitution as among
the three co-ordinate branches of the Government and as between the States and the Fed-
eral Government would soon disappear.”).
91 Id. at 573 (“Because it realized that this was a mistake Congress reversed itself,
restoring the jurisdiction in 1885.”).
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separation of powers.”92  I focus here on the analysis provided by President
Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General William French Smith, which he
announced in a May 1982 letter to Congress and later published as an official
Office of Legal Counsel opinion.93  Attorney General Smith’s analysis is the
most extensive (and apparently still most recent)94 public statement by the
executive branch on the scope of the exceptions power.
Attorney General Smith’s analysis relied on text, structure, history, and
the historical practices of the political branches.  The Attorney General
argued that although “Congress possesses some power to regulate the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,” “[t]he language of the Exceptions
Clause . . . does not support the conclusion that Congress possesses plenary
authority.”95  “An ‘exception’ cannot, as a matter of plain language, be read
so broadly as to swallow the general rule” of Article III—that the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over federal question cases.96  Moreo-
ver, Attorney General Smith insisted, the Framers believed that the Supreme
Court would play a “vital role in the constitutional scheme” by “review[ing]
state and federal laws for consistency with the Constitution.”97  Accordingly,
“it seems unlikely that they would have adopted, without controversy, a provi-
sion which would effectively authorize Congress to eliminate the Court’s core
functions.”98
Finally, Attorney General Smith emphasized that his construction of the
exceptions power was consistent with the historical practices of the executive
and legislative branches.  Although the executive had not always taken a firm
position on the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping bills, “[t]he Depart-
ment of Justice, in previous Administrations, has consistently opposed pro-
92 See 128 CONG. REC. 9093–97 (1982) (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney Gen-
eral William French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond);
Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings, supra note 49, at 17 (memorandum of Larry L. Sims,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., in response to request for Office of Legal Counsel’s views on
the Helms amendment) (showing that the Carter Administration endorsed Henry Hart’s
theory that Congress could not undermine the Supreme Court’s “essential role,” and that
the administration concluded that it would be “difficult to conceive of a more essential role
for the Court than to preserve the unity of our constitutional law”); see also infra note 150
(discussing Hart’s theory).
93 128 CONG. REC. 9093–97 (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney General William
French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond); Constitutional-
ity of Legislation Withdrawing Supreme Court Jurisdiction to Consider Cases Relating to
Voluntary Prayer, 6 Op. O.L.C. 13 (1982).
94 See infra notes 103, 141.
95 128 CONG. REC. 9093–94 (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney General William
French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond).
96 Id. at 9094 (“The concept of an ‘exception’ was understood by the Framers, as it is
defined today, as meaning an exclusion from a general rule or law.”).
97 Id. at 9095.
98 Id. at 9095–96 (“[I]t seems unlikely that the Framers intended the Exceptions
Clause to empower Congress to impair the Supreme Court’s core functions in the constitu-
tional scheme.”).
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posals to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction.”99  Likewise, the historical
practices of the legislative branch supported a narrow construction of the
exceptions power.  The Attorney General observed that although Congress in
1789 had not vested the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over every
federal question case, “[e]ach of the areas of incomplete jurisdiction has
long since been filled.”100  And “[t]he vast majority of constitutional deci-
sions which are on the books today, and which affect our national life in
many and important ways, have been rendered by the Court under a statu-
tory regime which included . . . broad appellate jurisdiction.”101  Accord-
ingly, “the history of Supreme Court appellate review has confirmed the
importance of its core functions.”102  “The gloss which life has written on the
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is one which protects the essential role of the
Court in the constitutional plan.”103
II. ASSESSING POLITICAL BRANCH CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLE III
The Supreme Court has said very little about the meaning of the Excep-
tions Clause, so political actors have been largely on their own in evaluating
various proposed “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction.  I consider here what the political debates might tell us about
constitutional interpretation in the political branches and then raise ques-
tions about whether, or the extent to which, the judiciary should be influ-
enced by these political branch practices.
A. Preliminary Concern: Principle or Politics (or Both)?
At the outset, I want to address a preliminary question: whether it makes
sense to take seriously the constitutional arguments of the political branches.
The historical record certainly suggests that political actors were concerned
with not only the policy but also the constitutionality of the exceptions and
regulations made to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  For example, legisla-
tors pointed to the Exceptions Clause as the source of authority for certiorari
measures, rather than simply discussing the wisdom of the legislation.104
99 Id. at 9094 n.1 (citing congressional testimony by Department of Justice officials as
well as internal Department of Justice memos dating from the 1950s to the 1980s).
100 Id. at 9096–97.
101 Id. at 9097.
102 Id. (“The Supreme Court now has appellate jurisdiction over all federal cases.”).
103 Id. (“As Justice Frankfurter said in another context, . . . . ‘It is an inadmissibly nar-
row conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitu-
tion and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.’”) (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Nota-
bly, Reagan’s second Attorney General Edwin Meese endorsed Attorney General Smith’s
position during his confirmation hearings. The President’s Nomination of Edwin Meese III to be
Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.
185–86 (1984) (stating that it “would be unwise as well as impermissible under the Consti-
tution” for Congress to “diminish or take away the core functions of the Supreme Court”).
104 See supra subsection I.B.2.
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Likewise, there was no widespread assumption that Congress had plenary
power to strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.  Supporters of jurisdiction-
stripping measures went to great lengths to defend the measures against alle-
gations that they were “anticonstitutional”—apparently anticipating that
opponents would (as they did) challenge the measures on constitutional
grounds.105  The assumption among all political actors seemed to be that,
even if some might desire as a policy matter to restrict the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction, it would be inappropriate to do so if the measure were deemed
unconstitutional.
It may, however, be difficult to discern the extent to which political
actors were expressing their sincere beliefs about the meaning of the Consti-
tution, rather than advancing constitutional arguments for political gain.106
Although there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of legislators’ arguments
with respect to certiorari measures (there was generally broad and bipartisan
support for such legislation),107 it is more challenging to evaluate the consti-
tutional arguments on jurisdiction-stripping proposals.  As I have docu-
mented in earlier work,108 a legislator’s attitude toward jurisdiction-stripping
measures tends to align with the legislator’s overall agreement (or disagree-
ment) with the judiciary’s decisions.  For example, in the late twentieth cen-
tury, when the Supreme Court was known for its progressive decisions on
issues like school prayer and abortion, social conservatives advocated jurisdic-
tion-stripping measures while social progressives sought to block any effort to
remove cases from the Court.109
The executive branch’s consistent opposition to jurisdiction-stripping
legislation cannot be explained on partisan grounds.  After all, the Franklin
Roosevelt and Reagan Administrations opposed efforts to strip the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction despite their strong disagreement with the
Court’s rulings; as noted, the Roosevelt Administration objected to the
Court’s invalidation of New Deal programs, and the Reagan Administration
openly opposed the Court’s school prayer and abortion decisions.110  That
105 152 CONG. REC. H5409 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of Rep. Mike Pence); see
supra subsection I.B.1.
106 Neal Devins, for example, has raised important questions about the extent to which
members of Congress are concerned about the constitutionality of legislation. See, e.g.,
Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Judicial Review: Lessons from the Affordable Care Act, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2012) (asserting that “party polarization contributes to congres-
sional disinterest in the Constitution”).
107 See Grove, Exceptions Clause, supra note 2, at 986–87.  Although there was only mod-
est bipartisan support for the 1891 Judiciary Act that introduced the concept of discretion-
ary certiorari review, see id. at 952–59, there was broad and bipartisan support for every
subsequent statute that expanded certiorari review, see id. at 962–68, 969–72, 976–78.
108 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2, at 890–916; id. at 933–40 (providing an
appendix, detailing the breakdown of votes on jurisdiction-stripping measures).
109 See id. at 900–16.
110 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 281–82 (documenting President Rea-
gan public attacks on the Supreme Court’s abortion and school prayer decisions); supra
note 78–82 and accompanying text.
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does not mean, however, that the executive branch’s opposition to jurisdic-
tion-stripping measures was based exclusively on its sincere constitutional
views.111  The President has an incentive to preserve Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion over constitutional claims because, as political scientists have urged,
Presidents often seek to advance their constitutional philosophy through liti-
gation in the Supreme Court.112  Furthermore, the Department of Justice has
a strong institutional interest in preserving the Supreme Court’s appellate
review power because it can thereby advance its own influence over the devel-
opment of federal law.  The Solicitor General is in charge of virtually all fed-
eral litigation in the Supreme Court.113  Thus, as former Solicitor General
Drew Days put it, “[o]nce cases reach the Supreme Court, the Solicitor Gen-
eral plays an important role in the development of American law and can
have [a substantial] impact upon the establishment of constitutional and
other principles.”114
Notably, these institutional incentives help explain not only the execu-
tive branch’s opposition to jurisdiction-stripping measures but also the
Roosevelt Administration’s preference for the Court-packing plan.  Presi-
dents have an incentive to preserve Supreme Court jurisdiction because they
can use the Court to advance their constitutional philosophy.  For similar
reasons, Presidents endeavor to nominate justices—preferably, as many as
possible—who are sympathetic to that philosophy.  In other words, Presi-
dents who seek to promote their constitutional views through the judiciary
have an incentive to “pack” the Court.115
The attitude of legislative and executive officials toward jurisdictional
and other court-related legislation could thus be explained by something
other than their sincere views about constitutional meaning.  It nevertheless
seems significant that these political actors made the effort to oppose—or
defend—jurisdictional legislation in constitutional terms.  As Curtis Bradley
and Trevor Morrison have recently argued, when political actors make consti-
tutional or other legal arguments, they tap into a culture that views the legal-
111 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 2, at 260–66.
112 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 5, 274
(2007) (arguing that Presidents often “[t]urn[ ] to the judiciary . . . [to] advanc[e] consti-
tutional goals”); Howard Gillman, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Ori-
gins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 138, 146–55 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006) (discussing the
efforts of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to appoint judges who would favor
civil rights and other progressive causes).
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2012); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 93
(1994).
114 Drew S. Days, III, Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The Solicitor General’s
Ethical Dilemma, 22 NOVA L. REV. 679, 680 (1998).
115 For that reason, “Roosevelt’s proposal to pack the Court with his supporters con-
tained no provision requiring judicial restraint at all. . . . The administration hoped to
harness the power of the Court, not destroy it.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 112, at 266–67
(emphasis added).
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ity of a given action as highly salient.116  There seems to be widespread
agreement in this country—among government officials, the media, and the
general public—that the government should not engage in “unconstitu-
tional” conduct,117 even if individuals may disagree on what counts as
“unconstitutional.”  That helps explain why, Bradley and Morrison argue,
Presidents are careful to defend their foreign policy decisions in legal terms,
even when those decisions may never be subject to challenge in court.118
Executive officials recognize that the “political costs” of certain actions “may
go up with their perceived illegality.”119
By the same reasoning, both proponents and opponents of jurisdiction-
stripping measures seemed to assume that the proposals were less likely to be
enacted if they were perceived as unconstitutional.  That explains both why
proponents like Senators Jenner, Butler, and Helms were so careful to
defend their proposals in constitutional terms, and why opponents attacked
the measures on constitutional grounds.  “[T]he decision to devote resources
to producing credible legal” arguments “suggests that legality is salient” in
this context.120  Constitutional concerns also seem to explain why, in the
debates over the Pledge bill, some legislators who strongly supported the
effort to strip inferior federal court jurisdiction opposed the measure as
applied to the Supreme Court.  Although those legislators believed that Con-
gress had plenary power over lower federal court jurisdiction, they did want
to “tamper[ ] with authorities clearly granted in the Constitution” by restrict-
ing Supreme Court review.121
There may be particularly good reason to take seriously the executive
branch’s constitutional arguments on jurisdiction-stripping measures.  Attor-
neys at the Department of Justice are trained in a legal culture that cares
deeply about the constitutionality of action.122  Accordingly, even if the exec-
116 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1140–44 (2013) (“[T]he decision to devote
resources to producing credible legal defenses of executive actions suggests that legality is
salient.”).
117 See id. at 1138 (noting that “legal argumentation might have a salience with the
media, the public at large, and influential elites that could provide presidential opponents
in Congress and elsewhere with an incentive to criticize executive actions in legal terms”).
118 Id. at 1098–1100 (observing that, even in cases where there was “a low likelihood
that courts would resolve the dispute,” the executive has “offered public legal
justifications”).
119 Id. at 1151.
120 Id. at 1143; see also id. (“Over time, . . . . [i]f successfully defending the legality of
one’s actions has a political value, law may come to be partly constitutive of an official’s
preferences.”).
121 150 CONG. REC. H7472 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004) (statement of Rep. Judy Biggert);
supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
122 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 116, at 1132–33 (“Although lawyers serve in a
wide variety of roles throughout the executive branch, their experience of attending law
school means that they have all had a common socialization—a socialization that typically
entails taking law seriously on its own terms.”).  The assertion in the text is also based upon
my own experience as a litigator for the Department of Justice.
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utive branch’s constitutional arguments aligned with that branch’s institu-
tional interests, it seems quite plausible that many of the individual attorneys
involved (including the Attorneys General) viewed themselves as making sin-
cere constitutional claims.
B. Political Branch Construction of Article III
Although I do not want to discount the importance of partisan or institu-
tional motivations, I believe there are good reasons to credit political actors’
assertions that they were concerned—at least in part—with the constitution-
ality of proposed “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.  If nothing else, the participants in these debates
seemed to assume that constitutional concerns would raise the political costs
of enacting the legislation.  The debates over these jurisdictional regulations
thus offer a window into the way in which political actors deal with Article III
(and perhaps other constitutional) issues.  I highlight here a few features of
this political branch practice, including political actors’ reliance on their own
precedents and their use of constitutional standards that might not be
deemed “judicially manageable.”  These features suggest that political actors
are engaged in a very different enterprise than the judiciary when they inter-
pret Article III.
1. Reliance on Legislative and Executive Precedent
At the outset, I want to underscore that there was no general assumption
that the Supreme Court had settled the meaning of the Exceptions Clause in
McCardle.  Although proponents of jurisdiction-stripping measures at times
relied on McCardle to support a broad construction of the exceptions
power,123 opponents insisted that “McCardle is[ ] not the end of the mat-
ter.”124  Indeed, some opponents used the controversial circumstances of
that case (i.e., that Congress stripped Supreme Court jurisdiction to prevent
the Court from striking down a federal law) to condemn subsequent jurisdic-
tion-stripping measures.  During the debates over the Jenner-Butler bill,
Attorney General Rogers and some legislators urged Congress not to repeat
the “mistake” that it had made “during the troublous days of reconstruc-
tion.”125  The only consensus among legislators seemed to be that McCardle’s
broad reading of the exceptions power supported certiorari legislation;126
123 See supra notes 15, 27, 54.
124 128 CONG. REC. 21862 (1982) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
125 Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 22, at
573 (1958) (letter from Att’y Gen. William P. Rogers to Sen. James O. Eastland, Chairman,
S. Comm. on the Judiciary); 104 CONG. REC. 18686 (1958) (statement of Sen. Thomas
Hennings) (noting that “this bill is reminiscent of” that “ill-advised attack[ ] on the
Supreme Court”).
126 E.g., S. REP. NO. 96-35, at 2-3 (1979) (emphasis added) (“If Congress wants to make
the Court’s appellate jurisdiction totally discretionary or totally obligatory in nature, noth-
ing in the Constitution says “no.” See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).”).
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the case’s meaning as to jurisdiction-stripping proposals was very much open
to debate.
Accordingly, legislators and executive officials relied on constitutional
sources other than Supreme Court precedent, including the constitutional
text, structure, history, broad separation of powers principles, and their own
legislative and executive precedents.  I focus here on political actors’ reliance
on their own precedents, both because that seems to be a unique feature of
political branch constitutional interpretation and because such practices are
often overlooked in the Article III literature.127
Proponents of jurisdiction-stripping measures like Senator Helms
insisted that such proposals were not “‘unprecedented,’” because earlier leg-
islators had suggested similar bills.128  Opponents, however, pointed to Con-
gress’s failure to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation as evidence that such
measures were unconstitutional.  Senator Kennedy, for example, under-
scored that “none [of the bills cited by Senator Helms are] law.”129  Likewise,
during the debates over the Pledge bill, opponents argued that “[t]he fact
that no other Congress has passed a law that totally eliminates the federal
courts’ ability to review the constitutionality of a federal law should give all of
the Members pause when considering this legislation.”130
Opponents of jurisdiction-stripping measures also emphasized that the
legislation, if enacted, would establish “a very dangerous precedent”131 that
“would no doubt lead to further assaults on the judiciary.”132  “The result will
be to weaken, if not cripple, the independence of the Federal judiciary and
subvert the U.S. Constitution.”133
There is good reason to believe that such precedent-based arguments
had considerable significance in the context of jurisdiction-stripping debates.
Importantly, the legislative opponents of the Jenner-Butler bill, the school
prayer proposal, and the Pledge bill did not purport to support the Supreme
127 In fact, only a few legal scholars have studied executive or legislative reliance on
precedent.  For examples of some of the excellent work that has been done in this area,
see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111–46 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of nonjudicial precedent); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal
Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010) (offering an empirical analysis of the use of pre-
cedent by the Office of Legal Counsel).  Barry Friedman is one of the few Article III schol-
ars who seems to have recognized that court-curbing legislation may become more difficult
to enact as “[h]istorical precedents against Court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping pile
up.”  Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s
Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 64 (2002).
128 125 CONG. REC. 7636 (1979) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (“Some have
described [the school prayer measure] as an ‘unprecedented’ proposal. . . .  Nothing could
be more incorrect.”).
129 Id. (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.) (“[T]he Senator from North Car-
olina would be unable to give us any action by Congress which would take away the
[Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction to deal with constitutional issues.”).
130 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 105 (2004).
131 125 CONG. REC. 7654 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
132 H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 91.
133 125 CONG. REC. 7644 (1979) (statement of Sen. John Durkin).
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Court’s decisions on communism or prayer, nor did they argue that the use
of “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional.  On the
contrary, these legislators condemned communism,134 often advocated
prayer in school,135 and overwhelmingly agreed that the Pledge was valid.136
Accordingly, what likely concerned the legislators was not so much the loss of
federal jurisdiction over these specific issues, but rather the prospect that
each jurisdiction-stripping measure, if enacted, could serve as a “precedent”
for restricting jurisdiction over other constitutional claims that progressives
favored, such as abortion and racial and gender equality.  Indeed, some legis-
lators said as much.  For example, in opposing the school prayer measure,
Representative Harold Sawyer stated that, although he was “in favor of
allowing voluntary prayer in the schools,” “the thing that frighten[ed] [him]
about” the bill was that it might encourage future efforts to “deprive the
Supreme Court of any jurisdiction to cover the due process clause, or civil
rights, or equal treatment” and thereby “virtually emasculate the Bill of
Rights.”137
The executive branch was also concerned with prior political branch
practice.  Attorney General Smith expressly invoked precedent in support of
his view that Congress lacks power under the Exceptions Clause to interfere
with the Supreme Court’s “core functions.”  He noted that Congress since
1789 had gradually expanded the Court’s jurisdiction to encompass every
federal question and concluded that “the history of Supreme Court appellate
review” had thereby “confirmed the importance of its core functions.”138
Attorney General Smith also emphasized that his constitutional interpreta-
tion was consistent with prior executive branch opposition to jurisdiction-
stripping measures.139
Moreover, Attorney General Smith created an important precedent by
publishing his own strong defense of the Supreme Court as an official Office
of Legal Counsel opinion.  As Trevor Morrison has demonstrated, the execu-
134 See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 18682 (1958) (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley) (stating
that he “like all of us, loathe[s] this thing called communism”); id. at18685–86 (1958)
(statement of Sen. Thomas Hennings) (similarly expressing his strong opposition to
communism).
135 See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 7644 (statement of Sen. John Durkin) (agreeing with Sena-
tor Helms that “the Constitution and our own traditions offer room for allowing moments
of voluntary prayer by each student”); infra note 137 and accompanying text.
136 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-691, at 91 (“We do not oppose the legislation because we
believe that voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional”); see also
id. at 7–9 (showing that the House voted 400-7 and the Senate voted 99-0 to condemn the
Ninth Circuit decision invalidating the Pledge).
137 Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings, supra note 49, at 26 (statement of Rep. Harold
Sawyer).
138 128 CONG. REC. 9097 (1982) (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond).
139 See id. at 9094 n.1 (“The Department of Justice, in previous Administrations, has
consistently opposed proposals to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction.”).
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tive branch does not often depart from such precedents.140  Indeed, Attor-
ney General’s Smith analysis appears to still be the official position of the
executive branch on the scope of Congress’s exceptions power.141
Notably, political actors do not appear to treat precedent as binding in
the same way that we generally expect judges to do.142  As Michael Gerhardt
has observed, arguments from precedent have considerable resonance in
Congress but are not decisive.143  And although the Office of Legal Counsel
seems more inclined than the legislature to treat its own precedents as
authoritative, it does not appear to follow prior precedent as carefully as the
judiciary.144  In fact, the executive branch “occasionally comes close to sug-
gesting that mere disagreement with the substance of an earlier opinion is
enough to justify overruling” it.145  Accordingly, reliance on precedent
140 Morrison, supra note 127, at 1457–58 (asserting, based on an empirical analysis of
Office of Legal Counsel precedents from the Carter through the Obama Administrations,
that “OLC does not often overrule itself”).
141 The executive did not release any public documents pertaining to the Pledge bill
proposed in the early twenty-first century.  Nor did the executive take a public position on
the constitutionality of a provision of the Military Commissions Act, which purports to strip
both Supreme Court and inferior federal court jurisdiction over claims involving the “con-
ditions of confinement” of alleged enemy combatants in the war on terror. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(e)(2) (2012) (stating that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider any . . . action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of
the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of detainees).  To
the extent that the “conditions of confinement” provision bars Supreme Court review of
constitutional claims, it would be invalid under Attorney General Smith’s analysis.  The
passage of the Military Commissions Act (with the strong support of the executive) sug-
gests that although the executive’s attitude toward jurisdictional regulations may be partly
motivated by constitutional concerns, such concerns do not always override policy matters.
142 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (joint opinion
of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“[A] decision to overrule should rest on some
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”); see also id.
at 854–55 (identifying factors to govern the overruling of precedent, including whether
the rule from the prior decision has proven unworkable; whether the rule has generated
significant reliance interests; whether the rule is inconsistent with subsequent legal devel-
opments in related areas; or whether the facts have changed so as to “rob[ ] the old rule of
significant application or justification”).
143 See GERHARDT, supra note 127, at 138–45.  Indeed, it is difficult to discern the extent
to which legislators are constrained by their precedents.  After all, legislators tend to cite
legislative precedents with which they agree. Cf. Fredrick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“If precedent matters, a prior decision now believed erroneous still
affects the current decision simply because it is prior.”).
144 Morrison asserts that the Office of Legal Counsel at times seems to adhere to its
precedents for reasons similar to those offered by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, although the Office of Legal Counsel “occasionally comes close to
suggesting that mere disagreement with the substance of an earlier opinion is enough to
justify overruling.”  Morrison, supra note 127, at 1504–11; see supra note 142.
145 Morrison, supra note 127, at 1511.  Furthermore, Morrison has argued that the
executive may legitimately depart from a prior opinion that “cannot be reconciled with the
current President’s considered constitutional views.” Id. at 1511.
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appears to be an important part—but only part—of constitutional interpreta-
tion in the political branches.
2. (Lack of a) Judicially Manageable Standard
The legislative and executive debates over the Exceptions Clause reveal
another feature of constitutional interpretation in the political branches.
Political actors were clearly unconcerned with articulating constitutional
principles that might be deemed workable for the judiciary.  As Richard Fal-
lon and others have observed, when the Supreme Court crafts constitutional
tests for the lower federal and state courts, it seeks to identify a “judicially-
manageable standard.”146  Although the Court has not clearly defined what
counts as “judicially manageable,” it has suggested that such a standard
should provide sufficient guidance to lower courts to enable them to make
reasonably predictable and principled rulings, rather than ad hoc, subjective
judgments.147
But in debating jurisdictional proposals, political actors relied on stan-
dards that would likely not satisfy that (minimal) test.  For example, in
describing Congress’s power to enact certiorari measures, the Senate Judici-
ary Committee stated that Congress may “confer as much or as little compul-
sory jurisdiction as it deems necessary and proper, including such exceptions as
Congress thinks appropriate.”148  The same kind of open-ended, discretion-
ary standards can be found in the jurisdiction-stripping debates.  In opposing
the Jenner-Butler bill, Senator Wiley claimed that the exceptions power was
limited by a “principle of reasonableness” that, in his view, prohibited Con-
gress from stripping Supreme Court jurisdiction simply because legislators
disagreed with certain decisions.149  Furthermore, many political actors have
been drawn to Henry Hart’s theory that Congress may not use its exceptions
146 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1276 (2006) (asserting that “disparities between constitutional
meaning and judicial doctrine arise frequently in constitutional adjudication as the result
of the demand for judicially manageable standards”).
147 See id. at 1281, 1287–93, 1331 (observing that the Supreme Court has apparently
“never attempted to define what it means by judicially manageable standards” but identify-
ing various “practical desiderata that guide assessments of judicial manageability,” includ-
ing whether the rule or standard can generate reasonably predictable and consistent
results); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22 (2013) (noting
that the Court has suggested that “a rule of decision fails [the] test [for judicial managea-
bility] when it relies excessively on jurists’ subjective judgments, or when it fails to generate
predictable guidance” (footnote omitted)).
148 S. REP. NO. 96-35, at 2–3 (1979) (emphasis added); see S. REP. NO. 100-300, at 3
(1988) (same); see also S. REP. NO. 95-985, at 3 (1978) (same).
149 104 CONG. REC. 18682-63 (1958) (statement of Sen. Alexander Wiley) (“[T]he
implementation of the disagreements with the Supreme Court decision by the enactment
of law to make such decisions in the future impossible . . . [is an] abuse  . . . of the powers
of the legislature to determine the appellate powers of the High Court.”); see also id. (“This
legislation violently tampers with the basic law of the land as established by the Founding
Fathers.”).
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power to impair the Supreme Court’s “essential role” in the constitutional
plan,150 even though that theory has been criticized as too indeterminate to
guide courts.151  Both the Carter and the Reagan Administrations as well as a
number of legislators contended that the political branches could not inter-
fere with the Supreme Court’s “essential role” or “core functions.”152
There may, however, be little reason for political actors to employ stan-
dards that would be deemed workable by the judiciary.  As Akhil Amar and
others have recognized, “judges seek[ ] ‘mediating principles’ to implement
constitutional values in case by case adjudication” so that “adjudication [will]
appear more ‘legal’ and less ‘political.’”153  But this “preference for bright-
line rules is one intimately bound up with special institutional needs of
courts, and thus . . . less relevant to” other government officials.154  In other
words, even if principles like “reasonableness” and “core functions” are not
judicially manageable, perhaps they could be deemed politically manageable
standards.155
150 In 1953, Henry Hart famously suggested that any “exceptions” should “not be such
as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”  Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953).  Although Hart presented this theory as part
of a dialectic (and thus may not have believed there was such a limit on congressional
power), Hart’s article has long been viewed as the source of this constitutional theory.
151 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1499, 1514 (1990) (describing the “‘essential function’ test[ ]” as “fuzz[y]”); see
also James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III and the Scottish Judiciary, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1613, 1671 (2011) (noting that the essential role theory “has been faulted for its indetermi-
nacy and its lack of textual foundation”).
152 See supra notes 80, 92–103 and accompanying text.
153 Amar, supra note 151, at 1514 (footnote omitted).
154 Id. at 1514–15 (footnote omitted); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITU-
TION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 60–61 (1999) (similarly emphasizing that “[c]ourts may
design some doctrines,” including standards like rational basis scrutiny, “to reflect their
sense of their own limited abilities, not to reflect directly substantive constitutional
values”).
155 Along the same lines, political actors have relied on broad separation of powers
principles in arguing about jurisdiction-stripping measures. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-
691, at 94 (2004) (Minority Report) (“The [Pledge bill] intrudes upon the long-standing
principle of separation of powers between the branches of government.”).  In recent work,
John Manning has powerfully argued that “the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle
of separation of powers.”  John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011).  Thus, Manning asserts that courts should not invalidate
congressional action on the ground that it violates general separation of powers principles
but should recognize that the Constitution through “the Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .
delegates to Congress broad and explicit (though not limitless) discretion” to determine
the allocation of power among the branches of government.  John F. Manning, The Supreme
Court, 2013 Term—Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6, 6–8
(2014).  Notably, Manning does not appear to assert that legislators and executive officials
themselves should reject the idea of a “freestanding principle of separation of powers.”
Indeed, there is an interesting question whether Congress, in carrying out its power under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to allocate authority among the branches, should take
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3. The Need for Further Study of Political Branch Interpretation
These features of constitutional interpretation by the political branches
suggest that political actors engage in a very different enterprise than the
judiciary when they interpret the provisions of Article III.  Political actors
look closely at their own precedents, without necessarily viewing those prece-
dents as binding.  Political actors also rely on loose and ambiguous standards
that would likely not be deemed sufficient for courts.  These differences sug-
gest that political actors may enforce Article III in ways that differ from
courts.  Accordingly, there is good reason for scholars to devote more atten-
tion to legislative and executive practice in this area.
First, scholars should consider that political actors might deem a given
jurisdictional proposal to be unconstitutional, even if the measure, if
enacted, would be upheld by a court.156  As Larry Sager and others have
observed, some constitutional norms are “underenforced” by the judiciary
because of the distinct institutional limitations of the courts.157  In fact, that
is one reason why some constitutional issues are said to be “political ques-
tions”; the judiciary lacks the institutional resources to enforce those consti-
tutional norms.158
such broad principles into account.  The answer to that question is beyond the scope of
this Essay, but I hope to explore it in future work.
156 There is a practical reason for scholars to study the political branches’ approach to
Article III.  Over the years, legal academics have often been called upon to testify in legisla-
tive hearings about the constitutionality of jurisdictional proposals. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO.
108-691, at 50 (2004) (noting that the House Judiciary Committee heard testimony from
two law professors on the Pledge bill).  In arguing in favor of or against jurisdictional regu-
lations, scholars should be mindful of the very different institutional context in which polit-
ical actors operate.  It may be that a scholar could argue in a legislative hearing that a given
jurisdictional regulation was unconstitutional—even if that scholar believed the measure, if
enacted, would be upheld by a court. See also TUSHNET, supra note 154, at 62 (suggesting
that scholars should not draw only on Supreme Court opinions when advising members of
Congress on the constitutionality of legislation).
157 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (arguing that when the Supreme Court
“because of institutional concerns, . . . fail[s] to enforce a provision of the Constitution to
its full conceptual boundaries,” “we should treat these ‘underenforced’ constitutional
norms as valid to their conceptual limits, and understand the contours of federal judicial
doctrine regarding these norms to mark only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role of
enforcement”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“A crucial mission of the
Court is to implement the Constitution successfully.  In service of this mission, the Court
often must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect the Consti-
tution’s meaning precisely.”).
158 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002) (“Underlying
the political question doctrine . . . is the recognition that the political branches possess
institutional characteristics that make them superior to the judiciary in deciding certain
constitutional questions.”).  For an argument that the modern political question doctrine,
as developed and applied by the Supreme Court, does not in fact involve such deference to
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But such judicially underenforced constitutional norms could still
guide—and constrain—political actors.159  Thus, for example, if the “essen-
tial role” theory were the correct reading of the exceptions power—such that
Congress may not make “exceptions” that deprive the Supreme Court of its
essential role in the constitutional plan—that might not be a judicially
enforceable constitutional norm.  But the norm could still be applied and
enforced by the legislative and executive branches.
Indeed, the historical practices of the political branches could support a
claim that the Exceptions Clause empowers Congress only to “‘obviate and
remove’ . . . ‘inconveniences’ likely to arise within the judicial system”160 but
not to interfere with the Supreme Court’s “core functions.”161  After all, Con-
gress has repeatedly used its exceptions power to protect the Court “from an
excessive burden of litigation” by creating and expanding certiorari
review,162 while it has virtually never used that power to strip the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.  Although this historical record may not be clear
enough to justify judicial invalidation of a jurisdiction-stripping measure (a
matter discussed further below), the argument from historical practice could
have resonance in Congress.  Attorney General Smith seemed to assume that
such an argument would have political salience when he declared in his let-
ter to Congress that the practices of the political branches had “confirmed
the importance of [the Supreme Court’s] core functions.”163  “The gloss
which life has written on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is one which pro-
tects the essential role of the Court in the constitutional plan.”164
Second, and more generally, scholarly study of political branch practice
would also call attention to—and perhaps raise normative questions about—
the way in which political actors approach constitutional interpretation.
Scholars could examine the two phenomena I have focused on here: political
actors’ reliance on their own precedents and on rather vague principles to
guide their interpretation of Article III.  The legislative and executive debates
the political branches, see Tara Leigh Grove, Reconsidering the Political Question Doctrine, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (draft on file with author).
159 See David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s Non-
Enforcement Power, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 63–64 (emphasizing
“the degree to which the Supreme Court’s own institutional characteristics shape its inter-
pretation” and arguing that the President should at times decline to enforce statutes, even
when they would be upheld by courts, because the President can protect constitutional
values that courts cannot enforce); Sager, supra note 157, at 1221, 1227 (“[The] obligation
to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins requires governmental officials
to fashion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference
to these conceptions.”)
160 128 CONG. REC. 21858 (1982) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (quoting THE FEDER-
ALIST NO. 80, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
161 Id. at 21862 (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
162 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson); see supra Part I.B.
163 128 CONG. REC. 9093, 9097 (1982) (letter dated May 6, 1982, from Attorney General
William French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond) (“The
Supreme Court now has appellate jurisdiction over all federal cases.”).
164 Id.
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over the exceptions power also raise other questions.  For example, political
actors often emphasized the intent of the Framers rather than the original
meaning of the Exceptions Clause.165  Such intent-based originalism has
been largely discredited within legal academia, at least for the judiciary.166
There is an important question whether intent-based originalism is equally
objectionable for the political branches.167
My goal here is not to offer a comprehensive theory of constitutional
interpretation by the political branches.  Instead, I seek primarily to draw
attention to the fact that, as in other separation of powers arenas, political
actors do seem concerned about the constitutionality of the jurisdictional
regulations they enact.  Examining political actors’ application of Article III
could not only shed light on how the political branches will approach future
jurisdictional proposals but also provoke study of how the political branches
do (and should) interpret the Federal Constitution.
C. Political Branch Precedents in the Judiciary
Political actors seem to care about their own precedents in interpreting
the scope of their power under Article III.  But there is a separate question
whether the judiciary should rely on the constitutional interpretations and
practices of Congress and the executive branch, if and when similar issues
reach the courts.  I suggest here that there are reasons for the judiciary to be
cautious about relying too heavily on political branch practice.
Some forms of interpretation may, of course, exclude reliance on politi-
cal branch practice.  For example, if a judge concluded that constitutional
meaning should be determined exclusively (or almost exclusively) by Found-
165 See, e.g., id. at 21857 (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (opposing the school prayer
measure on the ground that “the Framers of the Constitution intended that the Supreme
Court enforce the supremacy clause”); id. at 9093, 9095 (letter dated May 6, 1982, from
Attorney General William French Smith to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom
Thurmond) (“[I]t seems unlikely that the Framers intended the Exceptions Clause to
empower Congress to impair the Supreme Court’s core functions in the constitutional
scheme.”).
166 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 94 (2013) (“No longer
do originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers.”); Gary Lawson
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (“Ever
since 1986, when then-Judge Antonin Scalia articulated the distinction between original
intent, i.e., the subjective thoughts of historically concrete drafters and/or ratifiers, and
original meaning, i.e., the meaning that a reasonable person would attribute to textual
language, modern originalists have moved steadily towards the latter.”).
167 Intent-based originalism has been strongly criticized on the ground that it is diffi-
cult to ascribe any “intent” to a multimember group like those who participated in the
Philadelphia Convention and Ratification debates. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 213–17 (1980).  The same objection would
seem to apply to the political branches as well.  But perhaps there are institutional reasons
for the political branches to have more leeway than the judiciary when engaging in consti-
tutional interpretation.  In short, I seek to raise (without answering) the question whether
there is a one-size-fits-all approach to constitutional interpretation.
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ing-era sources, then the subsequent practices and constitutional interpreta-
tions of the political branches would be largely irrelevant.  But even if a judge
applied an alternative interpretive method that would not foreclose resort to
political branch practice (such as forms of new originalism168 or common
law constitutionalism169), there are, I believe, reasons for judges to be hesi-
tant about giving substantial weight to political branch constructions of Arti-
cle III.
First, a judge may not want to rely on executive and legislative prece-
dents that used an approach to constitutional interpretation that the judge
deems inappropriate.  As discussed, political actors have engaged in interpre-
tive practices that scholars have criticized in the context of the judiciary—by,
for example, looking to the intent of the Framers and invoking standards like
“reasonableness” and “core functions” that might not be deemed judicially
manageable.170  Even if those interpretive approaches are appropriate for
the political branches (a matter that, in my view, warrants further scholarly
study), it may make sense for a judge to think twice before using political
branch practices based on such methods as establishing the “authoritative”
meaning of Article III.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, it may be challenging for a
judge to discern whether a given measure was enacted or rejected on consti-
tutional, as opposed to policy, grounds.  That is particularly true with respect
to legislative rejection of jurisdiction-stripping measures.  As discussed, there
is a high correlation between legislators’ votes on jurisdiction-stripping legis-
lation and their general attitude toward the judiciary at a given time.  That is,
political actors who disapprove the general trend of judicial decisions tend to
favor jurisdiction stripping; those who favor the judiciary’s rulings tend to
oppose such restrictions.171 Although political actors’ emphasis on the con-
stitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping bills indicates that constitutional con-
cerns influenced the debates (at least by raising the political costs of the
legislation), a judge would have difficulty determining that Congress rejected
168 Jack Balkin’s version of “new originalism” seems particularly conducive to reliance
on political branch practice. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–6 (2011)
(“offer[ing] a constitutional theory, framework originalism, which views the Constitution as
an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that Americans must
fill out over time through constitutional construction”).  For an excellent discussion of how
new originalists might use such evidence, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the
Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1978–80 (asserting that when a text is
“vague or irreducibly ambiguous,” “originalists can accept the use of historical practice to
liquidate constitutional meaning” but also noting that the normative question whether
originalists should “embrace a role for historical practice in constitutional construction . . .
is a complex question and different originalists may approach it differently”).
169 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).  Many judges may also sim-
ply look at a range of materials—text, history, structure, and precedent—without expressly
adopting any specific approach to constitutional interpretation.
170 See supra notes 146–55, 165–67 and accompanying text.
171 See Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 2, at 890-916; id. at 933–40 (providing an
appendix, detailing the breakdown of votes on jurisdiction-stripping measures).
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a given measure because legislators viewed it as unconstitutional.  Moreover,
most jurisdiction-stripping proposals have failed without committee hearings
or legislative debates.  In those cases, it would be even more challenging to
identify the rationale for the rejection.
Courts could more easily discern the executive’s official position on the
scope of Congress’s exceptions power.  The Attorney General, who often acts
through the Office of Legal Counsel, has official responsibility for determin-
ing the executive’s legal views.172  And since the Carter and Reagan Adminis-
trations, the executive has argued that Congress lacks the power to interfere
with the Supreme Court’s “core functions” by, for example, stripping its juris-
diction over constitutional claims.173  Assuming that the executive’s position
is sufficiently longstanding,174 courts could give some weight to the execu-
tive’s views.  But that is only the constitutional position of one branch—a
branch that, as discussed, has institutional incentives to oppose jurisdiction-
stripping legislation.  Accordingly, courts should not treat executive practice
as reflecting the settled view of the political branches.
There may, of course, be contexts in which political branch practices are
so longstanding and accepted that the judiciary could treat them as strong
evidence of the constitutionality of legislation.  That may be true of Con-
gress’s determination that it has the power under the Exceptions Clause to
grant the Supreme Court discretionary certiorari jurisdiction.  Since 1891,
the political branches have repeatedly exercised this power with bipartisan
support.  Accordingly, if the Court’s certiorari power were challenged,175 the
Court might be able to point to this historical practice as a “gloss” on the
judicial power under Article III.176
172 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–512 (2012).  The Attorney General had this responsibility from
the outset. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (requiring the Attorney General
“to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of
the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any
matters that may concern their departments”).  The Office of Legal Counsel provides
advice to the executive branch “on all constitutional questions.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE:
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, http://www.justice.gov/olc (last visited May 11, 2015).
173 See supra notes 92–103 and accompanying text.
174 As discussed, although the executive long opposed efforts to strip Supreme Court
review, the executive did not take a firm public position on the constitutionality of such
measures until 1980 (during the Carter Administration).  It is not clear that the executive’s
constitutional position is sufficiently longstanding to warrant judicial deference.  I do not
seek to resolve that issue here.
175 Notably, Edward Hartnett has raised important questions about the Court’s certio-
rari power. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
after the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (2000) (doubting whether the Court’s
certiorari power can be reconciled with “classic conceptions of judicial review, judicial
power, and the rule of law”).  So it is not inconceivable that a litigant may seek to challenge
the certiorari review scheme.
176 Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or
supply them.  It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
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Outside of such contexts, however, there are good reasons for the judici-
ary to independently interpret Article III, giving little, if any, weight to politi-
cal branch practices.  In fact, such independent interpretation may make
sense precisely because of the different institutional makeup and capacities
of the courts.  Although the political branches may be more capable of han-
dling broad standards like “core functions,” the judiciary may be better
attuned to protecting individual and minority rights in particular cases.177
Each branch of the federal government should perhaps bring its own institu-
tional strengths to bear by independently construing the provisions of Article
III.
CONCLUSION
Much of the constitutional history of the federal courts has been written
not by the judiciary but by the political branches.  As an illustration, this
Essay highlights how the political branches have given meaning to the Excep-
tions Clause of Article III over time—both by rejecting jurisdiction-stripping
measures and by enacting beneficial exceptions that facilitated the Supreme
Court’s capacity to oversee a growing judicial system.  Such political branch
practices are worthy of study because these practices not only are likely to
influence political actors’ treatment of future jurisdictional proposals but
also provide insight into the political branches’ approach to constitutional
interpretation more generally.  I do not, however, claim that the judiciary
should treat such political branch precedents as establishing the authoritative
meaning of Article III, if and when similar issues reach the courts.  There
may be good reasons for the different branches of government to implement
Article III in different ways, as befits the design and capacity of the particular
institution.
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them.”).
177 That may be particularly true in the context of challenges by detainees in the war on
terror. See supra note 141 (briefly discussing some of the legislation pertaining to the
detainees).
